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A NEW TEST FOR THE LEGALITY OF
CIVIL RIGHTS DEMONSTRATIONS
O N September 16, 1963, approximately 200 Negro students
marched from the campus of Florida A. & M. in Tallahassee
to the county jail to protest the arrest, the day before, of some of
their fellow classmates for attempting to integrate certain Tallahassee
movie theatres. They were also apparently marching to protest
general policies of segregation, including the segregation of the jail.
Outwardly, the students did not display the characteristics of a
normal demonstration, for they carried no signs and upon reaching
the jail grounds made no speeches or other verbal protests. Although
there was some singing and clapping, no violence was evident. Upon
reaching the service entrance of the jail, not normally used by the
public, a surprised deputy sheriff met them and requested that they
move back from the door. They complied, but for the next thirty
minutes stood or sat on the jail driveway and adjacent curtilage of
the jailhouse. Although the demonstrators blocked traffic on this
driveway, they did not block the vehicles on the public streets in the
vicinity of the jail. The sheriff arrived and gave the Negroes ten
minutes to disperse or else be arrested. A few left, but the majority
refused and were arrested and indicted under the Florida criminal
trespass statute.' The demonstrators were convicted by a jury, and
the Circuit Court affirmed the convictions.2 The United States
Supreme Court granted certiorari when further appeal in the state
court was prevented by the Florida District Court of Appeals' refusal
to review the convictions.3 Subsequently, the Court upheld the con-
victions, by a 5-4 decision, on the ground that there was sufficient
evidence to support the trespass charges.'
In Adderly v. Florida, the Supreme Court took a step which it
had previously hesitated to take. This opinion represents the first
decision by the Court, since the Negro civil rights movement gained
impetus in the early sixties, to permit the boundaries of property to
define the limits of the first amendment. This Comment will trace
1 FLA. STAT. ANN. § 821.18 (1965) provides:
Every trespass upon the property of another, committed with a malicious
and mischevious intent, the punishment of which is not specially provided
for, shall be punished by imprisonment not exceeding three months, or by
fine not exceeding one hundred dollars.
2 The opinion of the Florida Circuit Court for Leon County (1964) is unreported.
3 Adderly v. Florida, 175 So. 2d 249 (Fla. 1965) (per curiam), cert. granted, 382 U.S.
1023 (1966).
4 Adderly v. Florida, 385 U.S. 39 *(1966) (opinion for the majority written by Mr.
Justice Black; dissenting opinion written by Mr. Justice Douglas, concurred in by
the Chief Justice and Justices Brennan and Fortas).
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the decisional development in the area of civil rights demonstrations,
and discuss the significance Adderly has had upon the Negroes'
right to demonstrate.5
During the past six years, the Negro civil rights movement has
been most active in the streets and public meeting places. There is
daily mention in the newspapers of the various means of self-help
the Negroes are employing - picketing, protest marches, sit-ins, and
even wade-ins- in seeking equality under the law. It was only a
matter of time before the Supreme Court was faced with the oppor-
tunity of deciding the legality of these self-help methods. Generally,
the convictions the Court was requested to review resulted from
violation by demonstrators of petty criminal statutes, such as breach
of the peace,6 obstructing public passage ways,7 and failure to dis-
perse upon orders.8
In the line of cases preceding Adderly, the Court employed four
basic methods for reversing the lower court convictions.
The first method was displayed in the Court's initial sit-in case,
Garner v. Louisiana,9 in which it skirted the issue of whether the
Negroes had a constitutional right to be in a restaurant to protest its
segregated facilities. Rather, it decided the case on the basis of total
lack of relevant evidence to support a finding that a breach of peace
statute had been violated and therefore, there was a denial of due
process under the fourteenth amendment.'0 Thus, by failing to
directly meet the constitutional issues presented, Garner signaled the
Court's approach to future cases.
The Court also found the lack-of-evidence method a useful tool
in several other cases." Most significant of these was Brown v.
Louisiana,2 in which five Negroes were arrested for breach of the
peace while staging a sit-in in a small, segregated library. The Court
found that the Negroes did not disturb others, disrupt the library
5 See KALVEN, THE NEGRO AND THE FIRST AMENDMENT (1966) (excellent discussion
of the rights of the Negro under the first amendment before Adderly).
6 Brown v. Louisiana, 383 U.S. 131 (1966).
7Cox v. Louisiana, 379 U.S. 536 (1965).
8Henry v. City of Rock Hill, 376 U.S. 776 (1964) (per curiam) (common law, not
statutory, breach of the peace).
9 368 U.S. 157 (1961). This case involved the arrest of several Negroes for disturbing
the peace by attempting to be served at a segregated lunch counter. The Negroes were
peaceful and did nothing more than ask for service. The convictions were reversed by
a unanimous opinion because the record lacked any evidentiary support of the charge.
10 U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1, provides:
No State shall . . . deprive any person of life, liberty, or property, without
due process of law; nor deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal
protection of the laws.
11 Brown v. Louisiana, 383 U.S. 131 '(1966) ; cf. Wright v. Georgia, 373 U.S. 284
('1963) (breach of peace convictions for playing basketball in a segregated park,
reversed).
12383 U.S. 131 (1966).
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facilities, or violate the library regulations,'" and reversed the con-
victions since there was "not the slightest evidence which would or
could sustain the application of the statute to petitioners."' 4 The
majority conceded that the state could regulate its public facilities
but added that in so doing it should not use regulations as a means
to discriminate against those who were engaged in lawfully exercis-
ing their first amendment freedoms.'5 Thus the Court, in reversing
the convictions on a procedural due process ground, failed again to
decide the question of whether the first amendment guarantees dem-
onstrators the right to exercise their freedoms of free speech or
assembly against the wishes of property owners.
Mr. Justice Black wrote a strong dissent in Brown, perhaps in
anticipation of the Adderly case, in which he chided the majority for
not recognizing the right of a property owner to enjoy his property
for its normal and dedicated use.' 6 Apparently the Court did not
feel bound by the reasoning in Brown because the decision in
Adderly, written by Mr. Justice Black, adopts Black's dissenting
view in Brown. This might suggest that the Court's original enthu-
siasm for the demonstrations of the civil rights movement has dam-
pened somewhat.
Second, as evidenced by Cox v. Louisiana,17 the Supreme Court
has reversed convictions on the ground that the statutes upon which
they were based were void for vagueness. That is, the statutes were
found to be too broadly drawn to define and punish specific conduct
with the result that the statute does not give fair warning of the
conduct it prohibits. 8
Cox involved the arrest of the leader of 2000 demonstrators
protesting against segregation and discrimination. The leader was
convicted of disturbing the peace, obstructing public passages, and
131d. at 142.




16 Id. at 166, where Mr. Justice Black, in his dissent, wrote:
The First Amendment, I think, protects speech, writings, and expres-
sion of views in any manner in which they can be legitimately and validly
communicated. But I have never believed that it gives any person or group
of persons the constitutional right to go wherever they want, whenever they
please, without regard to the rights of private or public property or to state
law. . . . Though the First Amendment guarantees the right of assembly
and the right of petition along with the rights of speech, press, and religion,
it does not guarantee to any person the right to use someone else's property,
even that owned by government and dedicated to other purposes, as a stage to
express dissident ideas.
17 379 U.S. 536 (1965). There were two separate majority opinions delivered by Mr.
Justice Goldberg. No. 24 at 379 U.S. 536, reversed convictions for disturbing the
peace and obstructing public passages. No. 49 at 379 U.S. 559, reversed a conviction
for picketing before a courthouse.
18 Cantwell v. Connecticut, 310 U.S. 296 (1940).
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picketing near a courthouse.'" Despite the reversal of the breach of
peace conviction on the ground of vagueness, the Court used strong
dictum, later adopted in Adderly, to the effect that there is a proper
time and place for such demonstrations, and that it would have no
tolerance for demonstrations not properly held.
20
A third technique employed by the Court was to reverse the
convictions because, as a result of state action, the Negroes involved
were deprived of equal protection of the law secured to them by the
fourteenth amendment. 21 Generally this tactic was used where a state
statute or local ordinance required segregation, 2 or where there was
evidence of statements made by officials indicating a policy of
segregation. 2
As a fourth method, the Court has incorporated the first amend-
ment into the fourteenth and declared that the latter does not allow
states to make criminal the peaceful expression of unpopular views.
24
This is held to be an infringement upon the right to exercise the first
amendment freedoms. In this regard, Edwards v. South Carolina
25
19 Interestingly enough, the Court found that the statute prohibiting picketing near a
courthouse was a proper exercise of the state's police power. It felt that the state
had a legitimate interest in protecting its judicial system from any influences or
pressures such picketing might create. However, it reversed the conviction because
it found that the Chief of Police had authorized the demonstration to be held where
it was. To have upheld the conviction would have sanctioned entrapment by the
state.
20 379 U.S. at 574, where the Court stated:
Nothing we have said . . . is to be interpreted as sanctioning riotous
conduct . . . or demonstrations, however peaceful their conduct or commend-
able their motives, which conflict with properly drawn statutes and ordi-
nances designed to promote law and order, protect the community against
disorder, regulate traffic, safeguard legitimate interests in private and public
property, or protect the administration of justice and other essential govern-
ment functions ....
We also reaffirm . . . that the right of peaceful protest does not mean that
everyone with opinions or beliefs to express may do so at anytime and at any
place. There is a proper time and place for even the most peaceful protest
and a plain duty and responsibility on the part of all citizens to obey all
valid laws and regulations.
21 Civil Rights Cases, 109 U.S. 3 (1883) (established the doctrine that state action
cannot deprive Negroes of equal protection under the laws).
22 Robinson v. Florida, 378 U.S. 153 (1964) (state health regulations required segre-
gation of toilet facilities); Peterson v, City of Greenville, 373 U.S. 244 (1963)
(city ordinance required segregation in restaurants).
"Lombard v. Louisiana, 373 U.S. 267 (1963) (public officials openly stated that
Negroes could not desegregate lunch counters); Johnson v. Virginia, 373 U.S. 61
(1963) (per curiam) (traffic judge compelled segregation in his courtroom). See
also Griffin v. Maryland, 378 U.S. 130 (1964), in which the Court reversed con-
victions for trespassing in a segegated amusement park because the arresting indi-
vidual was a deputy sheriff acting in his authority as such rather than in his authority
as an agent of the park. The Griffin case is interesting because it seems to say that
if an arresting officer is not enforcing the laws equally, the Court will find the
necessary involvement by the state to make the convictions invalid under the four-
teenth amendment. This is consistent with the Court's refusal to permit discriminatory
use of the law at any level of the state government.
2
4 Henry v. City of Rock Hill, 376 U.S. 776 (1964) (per curiam) (demonstrators
assembled in a peaceful, orderly fashion in front of the city hall to protest segre-
gation.
25372 U.S. 229 (1963).
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is important, since it clearly shows that demonstrations on public
streets and in areas where the public is normally permitted to assem-
ble are clearly legal if they are orderly. Edwards involved demon-
strations on statehouse grounds which were open to the public.
The Court reversed the breach of peace convictions because it found
the Negroes' rights of speech, assembly, and petition for redress of
grievances were violated.
The result of these four methods is that the Negro civil rights
movement, as other protest movements which preceded it,2 6 now has
a claim to the use of the public streets and meeting places as a public
forum to express its first amendment freedoms subject only to non-
discriminatory regulations which the state may impose to preserve
social order and control. Until Adderly it appeared as if the Court
were going to sanction all demonstrations so long as they were
orderly and not in violation of a precise, narrowly drawn statute
prohibiting such activity. However, Adderly presented a well-de-
fined issue which could not be easily evaded. The Court could not
employ the first method discussed above because there was sufficient
evidence to support the criminal trespass convictions. 7 The mere
fact of the Negroes' presence on the property was enough evidence
to sustain the trespass charges. Moreover, unlike the breach of peace
statute in Cox, Florida's trespass statute defined specific conduct of
a limited kind and therefore was not void for vagueness.28 Nor, as
discussed in the third technique above, were the demonstrators denied
the equal protection of the laws guaranteed to them by the four-
teenth amendment, for there was no evidence that the trespass statute
was not enforced equally. The Negroes were arrested not because
the sheriff disagreed with the views they espoused, but only because
they were using the jailgrounds in a non-traditional manner. 29 The
case clearly was one within the fourth method mentioned and pre-
sented the court with the choice of either following its prior reason-
ing by supporting the demonstrators' rights to exercise their first
amendment freedoms or subordinating those rights to Florida's tres-
pass statute. The Court chose to depart from the trend of its previous
opinions and upheld the rights of the property owner, in this instance
the state, by allowing the demonstrators' convictions to stand.
It is significant that Adderly involved a demonstration on jail-
grounds whereas the demonstrations in Cox and Edwards were held
on courthouse and statehouse grounds respectively. The point is that
2 6See Cantwell v. Connecticut, 310 U.S. 296 (1940) ; Thornhill v. Alabama, 310 U.S.
88 (1940).
27 385 U.S. at 46.
28Id. at 42.
2 Id. at 47.
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from time immemorial, citizens have traditionally gathered at their
statehouses and customary meeting places to petition their govern-
ment and express their views. However, such demonstrations have
not been customary on jailgrounds. The Court emphasized that there
was "no evidence at all that on any other occasion had similarly large
groups of the public" congregated on the Tallahassee jailgrounds
for any reason.30
The Edwards, Cox and Adderly cases display the application of
what could be termed a normal use test which it appears the Court
developed to determine the validity of a civil rights demonstration.
Assuming that the Court is faced with the fundamental issue of
whether to sanction a certain demonstration as a proper exercise of
first amendment freedoms, it seems that the Court will now ask
whether it has been customary for the property to be used as a
platform for such demonstration. In so doing, the Court's concern
appears to be with whether or not the property is being put to its
dedicated use.31 The examination precipitates to the sole question
of whether or not the public previously has customarily gathered on
this place to exercise its constitutional rights. If it has, then the
demonstration is valid so long as it remains orderly.
If the Court continues to apply the normal use test to civil
rights demonstrations, there may be a significant effect on the Negro
civil rights movement. The Court in Adderly warns the Negroes
that their demonstrations are not warranted in all public places. It
advises them that the custodian of a public building has the power
to maintain the security of that building and to preserve the property
for its dedicated use." The most obvious repercussion Adderly will
have on the civil rights movement should be to cause its leaders to
hesitate before they organize a demonstration. Their lesson from
Adderly is that they no longer have free reign to demonstrate where
they please; consequently, they will be forced to choose their demon-
stration sites more carefully.
It is necessary to point out that by restricting itself to the ques-
tion of whether a demonstration is within the normal use of certain
public property, the Court could very easily bind itself to an inflexi-
ble test. On its face, the examination of the nature of the public
property involved appears sufficient to ascertain the validity of a
demonstration but it seems to be too narrow a test to apply when
one considers that the Court is balancing the valuable first amend-
ment freedoms against the concept of property ownership. A test
30 Ibid.
31 Ibid.: "The State, no less than a private owner of property, has power to preseve the




that stops at the consideration of only the nature and normal use of
the property fails to consider other important factors, such as the
time and manner of the demonstrations or the serenity or security
necessary for the proper use of the property. For example, by the
strict application of the normal use test, a demonstration on a state-
house lawn during the early hours of the morning or during the visit
of a foreign dignitary would be valid. Moreover, application of the
normal use test to a large demonstration protesting the discriminatory
practices of a cemetery might prove awkward with a showing that
similarly large groups had previously gathered on the cemetery
grounds for Memorial Day services or burials. Here, the factor of
serenity would be an important consideration.
Although in Adderly the Court made mention of the fact that
security was necessary for a jailhouse, 8 it did not emphasize this
factor as being important to the decision. Of course, it could be
argued that these factors are inident to a normal use of the property,
but as yet, the Court has not taken this step and until it does, the
civil rights leaders will be hesitant and uncertain regarding the status
of their demonstrations.
Unless the Court considers the above factors, and others of this
nature, as necessary elements in a normal use test, it will find itself
bound by a test too narrow to apply in all situations. It must be
pointed out, however, that the Court has not yet had the opportunity
to discuss any elements other than the place of the demonstration.
Therefore, the Court's position is not so firmly entrenched that it
cannot adopt these additional elements if it so desires. Adderly only
discussed the propriety of the place of the demonstration. But from
the language in Adderly, i.e., that persons cannot exercise their first
amendment freedoms "whenever and however and wherever they
please," 84 it seems reasonable that when the Court is presented with
the proper case it will adopt these other necessary elements and in so
doing give the normal use test the desired flexibility.
R. Franklin Erisman
3Id. at 41.
3 4 Id. at 48.
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